In the South Pacific Area, for example, the commander of a tank battalion in New Caledonia installed a flame gun in the pistol port of a tank, and a chemical officer on New Georgia modified the flame gun so that it could be fitted into the aperture for the tank's bow machine gun. The 1st Marine Tank Battalion, serving in the Southwest Pacific, mounted several portable flame throwers on its tanks in preparation for the New Britain operation. None of these improvisions could have been called successful. The portable flame thrower was not constructed to withstand the vibrations and jarrings
559
of a moving tank, and its fuel capacity was much too limited.2 Word came from Washington pointing out the disadvantages of range and fire hazards from such modifications and counseling patience until the arrival of perfected mechanized flame throwers from the zone of interior.3
After the bloody battle of Tarawa, which opened Allied offensive operations in the Central Pacific Area, an even greater clamor arose for a mechanized flame weapon. The portable flame thrower had done its part in that battle, but new weapons and techniques were urgently needed to help prevent the repetition of such staggering casualties. In preparation for the Marshall Islands operation scheduled for February 1944 both the 4th Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division installed M1A1 portable flame throwers, modified by the chemical section of the 7th Division, in light tanks and LVT's, an amphibious tractor. Included in the 7th Division's version were special fuel containers manufactured in Honolulu. But the attempts to waterproof the guns on the LVT's were unsuccessful, and the electrical systems of those flame weapons, drenched on landing, failed completely. The tank-mounted versions, plagued with the basic weaknesses of fragility and low fuel capacity, had but modest success.4
The poor results of flame thrower improvisation in the Pacific theaters was no cause for criticism of the responsible chemical officers and tank commanders; the portable flame thrower was basically unsuited for tank adaption. If nothing else, these efforts clearly indicated that improvisation was not the answer and underlined the real need for a mechanized flame thrower in the Pacific fighting.