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A woman should not have to choose between her livelihood and her personal safety. Good read for your legal buffs out there.
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PRESS RELEASE:
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PRESS RELEASE:
May 22, 2008
Contact:
(202) 408-7040; (703) 642-0207
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Law Professor will ask the U.S. Supreme Court to Reverse Decision Holding that a Woman
Can be Fired for being Stalked by a Stranger Roaming Freely through her Workplace
Washington, D.C.
Can be Fired for being Stalked by a Stranger Roaming Freely through her Workplace
Washington, D.C.
– On March 31, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Judges
Edwards, Henderson and Williams, decided the appeal of Martin v. Howard University, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19516, 1999 WL 1295339; 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 964; 15 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1587 (D.D.C.
1999). Prof. Dawn V. Martin was harassed by a serial campus stalker. Her contract was “not renewed” after
she asked the university to implement its own security procedures to bar the stalker from the law school.
During oral argument, on March 17, 2008, Ms. Martin told the Court: “The precedent set by this Court will
determine how employers and educational institutions will respond to stalking and other types of workplace
and campus violence – particularly when it is directed against women. If a woman can be stalked in her
workplace, and fired for asking her employer to take reasonable steps to keep him out of the workplace, then
women will be forced to choose between their safety and their livelihood – a Hobson’s choice.”
Less than two weeks later, in an unpublished decision by the three-judge panel, the Court squarely placed
women in the position of choosing between their jobs and their safety, if they are stalked at work. The serial
campus stalker only knew that Prof. Martin existed because he roamed through her workplace freely,
prowling for a female professor who fit his fantasy concept of a “wife.” This delusional, homeless man,
Leonard Harrison, had been targeting women of color, at Universities since the mid-1980s. Harrison had his
own vision of his “natural wife,” or “soul-mate,” whom he believed was the physical embodiment of a
fictional character, Geneva Crenshaw, in a book, written by the renowned NYU law professor, Derrick Bell.
Ms. Martin asked the entire Court to review the Panel decision, but no judge called for a vote on the case, so
her request was denied. Ms. Martin said: “The only hope for reversal now is to go to the United States
Supreme Court. I am looking for groups that are willing to come together to file a joint Amicus Brief at the
Supreme Court level.” Groups interested in providing support should contact Ms. Martin at
Edwards, Henderson and Williams, decided the appeal of Martin v. Howard University, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19516, 1999 WL 1295339; 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 964; 15 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1587 (D.D.C.
1999). Prof. Dawn V. Martin was harassed by a serial campus stalker. Her contract was “not renewed” after
she asked the university to implement its own security procedures to bar the stalker from the law school.
During oral argument, on March 17, 2008, Ms. Martin told the Court: “The precedent set by this Court will
determine how employers and educational institutions will respond to stalking and other types of workplace
and campus violence – particularly when it is directed against women. If a woman can be stalked in her
workplace, and fired for asking her employer to take reasonable steps to keep him out of the workplace, then
women will be forced to choose between their safety and their livelihood – a Hobson’s choice.”
Less than two weeks later, in an unpublished decision by the three-judge panel, the Court squarely placed
women in the position of choosing between their jobs and their safety, if they are stalked at work. The serial
campus stalker only knew that Prof. Martin existed because he roamed through her workplace freely,
prowling for a female professor who fit his fantasy concept of a “wife.” This delusional, homeless man,
Leonard Harrison, had been targeting women of color, at Universities since the mid-1980s. Harrison had his
own vision of his “natural wife,” or “soul-mate,” whom he believed was the physical embodiment of a
fictional character, Geneva Crenshaw, in a book, written by the renowned NYU law professor, Derrick Bell.
Ms. Martin asked the entire Court to review the Panel decision, but no judge called for a vote on the case, so
her request was denied. Ms. Martin said: “The only hope for reversal now is to go to the United States
Supreme Court. I am looking for groups that are willing to come together to file a joint Amicus Brief at the
Supreme Court level.” Groups interested in providing support should contact Ms. Martin at
.
In 1999, the federal district court set precedent in Martin by adopting the EEOC Regulation 29 CFR
1604.11(e), holding that an employer can be held liable for the sexual harassment of an employee, by a nonemployee,if the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take reasonable stepsto stop it. Howard asked the Court to reverse this decision and invalidate the EEOC Regulation. The Court
of Appeals did not address Howard’s argument, or otherwise discuss the lower court’s holding on how
employers should address non-employee harassment of employees.
In 1999, the federal district court set precedent in Martin by adopting the EEOC Regulation 29 CFR
1604.11(e), holding that an employer can be held liable for the sexual harassment of an employee, by a nonemployee,if the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take reasonable stepsto stop it. Howard asked the Court to reverse this decision and invalidate the EEOC Regulation. The Court
of Appeals did not address Howard’s argument, or otherwise discuss the lower court’s holding on how
employers should address non-employee harassment of employees.
Martin
is the first case considering the concept of “gender profiling” in employment, under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. The National Association of
Women Lawyers (NAWL), as Amicus Curiae filed a Brief supporting Martin. Ms. Martin said, “In 1999, the
district court judge said that it was ‘clear’ that Harrison harassed me based on my sex –but seven years later,
after all of the evidence was presented at trial, the same judge suddenly submitted the question to the jury.
The jurors were clearly confused on the law. They asked the court to give them additional instruction on the
definition of sexual harassment, but the judge would not provide it. Based on what they understood the law tobe, the jurors concluded that Harrison’ stalking was not sexual in nature or based on my gender. That meant
that there is no statute to protect me from being stalked in my workplace from being fired for reporting it.”
The Court of Appeals held that Ms. Martin misinterpreted Judge Hogan’s 1999 decision; however, on October 20, 2003, Magistrate Judge Facciola, to whom Judge Hogan referred the case, specifically detailed
what issues were decided in 1999 and would not be “triable issues of fact” for the jury and what issues wouldproceed to a jury at trial. The Court of Appeals discounted MJ Facciola’s interpretation of Judge Hogan’s
decision, stating that he could not overrule Judge Hogan; however, as Ms. Martin stressed in her Brief, ReplyBrief and oral argument, Judge Hogan adopted Judge Facciola’s decision as his own, on September 16, 2005.
The district court also held that “groping” and “touching” are “typical” indicia of sexual harassment cases andthat since Harrison did not touch Prof. Martin, the jury had reason to find that she was not sexually harassed.”The Court of Appeals did not address this issue. Since it has not been overturned, this precedent set by thisdecision arguably requires that a woman to be assaulted in order to establish that she was sexually harassed inher workplace.
The Court of Appeals also held that because, on one occasion in 1990, Harrison threatened Prof Bell, this was
enough to defeat Ms. Martin’s claim that Harrison harassed her because of her gender; however, Ms. Martinrepeatedly pointed out that Harrison did not stalk Prof. Bell. The legal definition of “stalking” requires
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. The National Association of
Women Lawyers (NAWL), as Amicus Curiae filed a Brief supporting Martin. Ms. Martin said, “In 1999, the
district court judge said that it was ‘clear’ that Harrison harassed me based on my sex –but seven years later,
after all of the evidence was presented at trial, the same judge suddenly submitted the question to the jury.
The jurors were clearly confused on the law. They asked the court to give them additional instruction on the
definition of sexual harassment, but the judge would not provide it. Based on what they understood the law tobe, the jurors concluded that Harrison’ stalking was not sexual in nature or based on my gender. That meant
that there is no statute to protect me from being stalked in my workplace from being fired for reporting it.”
The Court of Appeals held that Ms. Martin misinterpreted Judge Hogan’s 1999 decision; however, on October 20, 2003, Magistrate Judge Facciola, to whom Judge Hogan referred the case, specifically detailed
what issues were decided in 1999 and would not be “triable issues of fact” for the jury and what issues wouldproceed to a jury at trial. The Court of Appeals discounted MJ Facciola’s interpretation of Judge Hogan’s
decision, stating that he could not overrule Judge Hogan; however, as Ms. Martin stressed in her Brief, ReplyBrief and oral argument, Judge Hogan adopted Judge Facciola’s decision as his own, on September 16, 2005.
The district court also held that “groping” and “touching” are “typical” indicia of sexual harassment cases andthat since Harrison did not touch Prof. Martin, the jury had reason to find that she was not sexually harassed.”The Court of Appeals did not address this issue. Since it has not been overturned, this precedent set by thisdecision arguably requires that a woman to be assaulted in order to establish that she was sexually harassed inher workplace.
The Court of Appeals also held that because, on one occasion in 1990, Harrison threatened Prof Bell, this was
enough to defeat Ms. Martin’s claim that Harrison harassed her because of her gender; however, Ms. Martinrepeatedly pointed out that Harrison did not stalk Prof. Bell. The legal definition of “stalking” requires
repeated acts of harassment directed toward the same victim
. Harrison contacted Prof. Bell on only one
occasion, and then only to solicit his assistance in identifying the next woman he would stalk -- any woman
that he believed might be the “model” for “Geneva Crenshaw.” Ms. Martin said, “Howard’s argument is like
saying that John Hinckley did not sexually harass Jodie Foster when he stalked her because he also attempted
to kill President Reagan. The fact that a sexually harassing stalker may also have committed a violent act
against a man in his lifetime does not negate the fact that he sexually harassed a woman in another setting.”
occasion, and then only to solicit his assistance in identifying the next woman he would stalk -- any woman
that he believed might be the “model” for “Geneva Crenshaw.” Ms. Martin said, “Howard’s argument is like
saying that John Hinckley did not sexually harass Jodie Foster when he stalked her because he also attempted
to kill President Reagan. The fact that a sexually harassing stalker may also have committed a violent act
against a man in his lifetime does not negate the fact that he sexually harassed a woman in another setting.”
Martin
also presented issues regarding actionable retaliation under Title VII, but the Court of Appeals deemed
these issues moot.
Since the Court determined that Howard was free to commit any retaliatory act against
Prof. Martin for being stalked, with no Title VII penalty, the lower court’s definition of acts that constitute
actionable retaliation under Title VII was irrelevant to this case; however, the Court of Appeals’ failure to
reverse the lower court on this issue leaves the lower court’s precedent intact: an employer may leave
positions unfilled, cancel vacancies and/or convert advertised positions to positions for which an applicant is not the best qualified, even where it is done to prevent the most qualified applicant from being hired, inretaliation for reporting sexual harassment – or any other EEO violation, whether based on race, national
origin, religion, ethnicity, age or disability.
Ms. Martin also asked the Court to define the circumstances under which Title VII plaintiffs can be ordered topay the litigation costs of the defendant. The National Organization of Women (NOW) recently ran a campaignprotesting the 11th Circuit’s assessment of costs against the plaintiff in Ledbetter v. Goodyear, after the SupremeCourt ruled against her in her sex discrimination claim. Such assessments unfairly punish women who file sex
discrimination lawsuits, in good faith, in the public interest. The Court declined to address this issue.
The Court of Appeals also did not explain why Dean Alice Gresham Bullock’s perjury does not require
vacating the verdict.
In a July 1, 1999 memorandum to Howard’s General Counsel, Bullock admitted that she perceived Harrison as a threat to Prof. Martin and “other women” on campus; yet, at trial, she testified that she never perceived Harrison’s harassment as sexual harassment, or harassment based on sex/gender. Martin
said.
“Neither Howard nor her own personal counsel has denied that she committed perjury. Alice Gresham
Bullock created ten years of contentious and expensive litigation for both sides. She has caused ten years of
suffering for my family and me. We will never get those years back -- the years that I was raising my
daughter. This could all have been avoided if she had simply followed the university’s own security
procedures and barred Harrison from the law school rather than devoting her efforts to removing me from the
law school.”
Briefs are uploaded onto http://www.dvmartinlaw.com/MartinvHowardU.html). You may also hear radio interviews about the case at that cite.
these issues moot.
Since the Court determined that Howard was free to commit any retaliatory act against
Prof. Martin for being stalked, with no Title VII penalty, the lower court’s definition of acts that constitute
actionable retaliation under Title VII was irrelevant to this case; however, the Court of Appeals’ failure to
reverse the lower court on this issue leaves the lower court’s precedent intact: an employer may leave
positions unfilled, cancel vacancies and/or convert advertised positions to positions for which an applicant is not the best qualified, even where it is done to prevent the most qualified applicant from being hired, inretaliation for reporting sexual harassment – or any other EEO violation, whether based on race, national
origin, religion, ethnicity, age or disability.
Ms. Martin also asked the Court to define the circumstances under which Title VII plaintiffs can be ordered topay the litigation costs of the defendant. The National Organization of Women (NOW) recently ran a campaignprotesting the 11th Circuit’s assessment of costs against the plaintiff in Ledbetter v. Goodyear, after the SupremeCourt ruled against her in her sex discrimination claim. Such assessments unfairly punish women who file sex
discrimination lawsuits, in good faith, in the public interest. The Court declined to address this issue.
The Court of Appeals also did not explain why Dean Alice Gresham Bullock’s perjury does not require
vacating the verdict.
In a July 1, 1999 memorandum to Howard’s General Counsel, Bullock admitted that she perceived Harrison as a threat to Prof. Martin and “other women” on campus; yet, at trial, she testified that she never perceived Harrison’s harassment as sexual harassment, or harassment based on sex/gender. Martin
said.
“Neither Howard nor her own personal counsel has denied that she committed perjury. Alice Gresham
Bullock created ten years of contentious and expensive litigation for both sides. She has caused ten years of
suffering for my family and me. We will never get those years back -- the years that I was raising my
daughter. This could all have been avoided if she had simply followed the university’s own security
procedures and barred Harrison from the law school rather than devoting her efforts to removing me from the
law school.”
Briefs are uploaded onto http://www.dvmartinlaw.com/MartinvHowardU.html). You may also hear radio interviews about the case at that cite.