Theories of the Actual. Positing and Asserting
The possible world perspective also applies to creating, developing, and arguing about theories about our own real world. If we assume that we live in a possible world (a reasonable hypothesis), it would be of benefit to try to figure out what propositions are true in this world. Axiomatization doesn't work for this because that is a top-down world building procedure, not a bottom-up world analysis procedure.
We would need to begin with what we have good cause to know to be true. Without a general view, it is all too easy to pour into such a list everything we assume to be true or wish to be true or fear is true, and so forth.
This perspective makes a cautious process easier. We can start as Descartes and others before him did:
1. There is something that is experiencing things.
2. There is that which that something experiences.
Or in reverse order: I think, therefore I am.
In terms of what we know, that's the end of the list. We can't definitely get beyond solipsism.
Some people are fine stopping there. I'm looking at you, Mary Sue.
But suppose our goal is not to find what the world has to be, but to examine what the world might be. Suppose we want to see what the space of possible actual worlds is, and therefore to have an understanding of the breadth of possibilities we might be existing in.
In order to do that we need to add propositions to our minimal list above.
But that brings us to a human problem. There are two ways to add propositions, and they cause radical differences in how people think about the worlds that arise.
1. We can posit propositions. Positing is the provisional adding of a proposition. It is a subjunctive act, an act of supposition and following where that leads. Positing also carries the awareness that we might need to remove, alter, or replace the proposition we have posited depending on what arises from it. Positing makes visible a field of possible worlds and how they would work. It expands the awareness and gives ways to grasp hold of possibilities and see what can be done with them.
2. We can assert propositions. Assertion is an imperative action. It demands that a certain proposition be true regardless of what follows. Assertion narrows possibility by demanding that the world work a certain way without regard for whether or not it fits in with other aspects of the world.
In discussions of theories the more assertions are made, the less discussion is possible. But people often assume that the firmness of their belief should be reflected in the vehemence of their statements. As a result, few are willing to posit rather than assert what is vital in their own thinking.
But there is no need to reflect that inner solidity with outward assertion. Indeed, the willingness to posit creates a potential shared space for discussion.
There are three good reasons to posit a world that contains one's views rather than assert that this world must contain one's views.
1. Common shared possibilities may be found. It may be that the possible worlds one person posits and the possible worlds another person posits overlap in consequences even if they differ in premises. It may therefore be possible to share that space of consequences and discuss therein even if there is no agreement about the causes. Indeed, examining the shared space, one may discover that differences one thought were vast gaps can in fact be bridged.
2. The consequential thinking that comes from positing may allow one to refine or see new sides of a firmly held view. The more tightly one grips the idea, the less one may be aware of other potential formulations of the underlying thought. Further, the more firmly one holds to every aspect of the idea, the less capable one is of seeing that other people may be in fundamental agreement with one, even if they differ in surface details.
3. To understand that one's firmly held belief is contingent on other aspects of the world one lives in. It is all too easy to believe that one's views are not only true, but necessarily true. By accepting the possibility of worlds in which they are not true, it becomes possible to see more clearly one's reasons for thinking that they are true.