The distinction tends to be more important in libertarian circles - while I understand the argument, they tend to reduce to the same thing for me in practice. One simply cannot project oneself into the shoes of another time with any degree of certainty, whether they be of a common man or a constitutional framer. And claiming to do so is often a sneaking way of heading off a change one doesn't like.
Not just in libertarian circles, unless Scalia and other originalists are all libertarians now.
But seriously, the distinction is a pretty significant one. (And actually most of the
really venomous criticism of original intent comes from other originalists, not from realists or other schools of thought.)
But even if you still disagree, I think it's also important to accept the distinction in order to understand and criticize Scalia on his own terms. If Scalia doesn't focus on original intent, then those who criticize him for focusing on it are a bit off the money, right?
In my view, the Roberts court has morphed into a body that makes decisions based on ideology first and subsequently pretzels any precedent they can find to fit later. The conservative wing does that by claiming (reductively speaking) that we live in the same world as we did in 1783. The liberal wing disagrees.
There's a Slate article that expresses it better than I'm doing, but I'm not having any luck finding it at the moment. Will post it if I do.
Sure, I think there's some validity there, but that doesn't really demonstrate that Scalia's philosophy is uniquely attached to that practice, more so than other ways of reading law. And if we're talking about precedent, then that argument becomes even trickier. Who tends to rely more on precedent: originalists, or non-originalists? It's the non-originalists, don't you think?
I'd be happy to take a look at the Slate article if you have any luck finding it.