Why do you believe what you believe?

[DrZoidberg]

I wouldn't argue against your statement that religion offers something that science can't. But do you think that religion offers something that can't be found via secular means? Can art, and fellowship and philosophy and philanthrophy not serve us just as well?

Does it matter? What's the difference? The problem isn't whether somebody is religious or not. As far as I'm concerned the problem is some people bashing in heads demanding that other people communicate in the exact same way they are. Whether those who do this are religious or not is of little or no consequence. If we keep our minds agile and learn to switch language depending on what the situation demands, it really makes no difference what language, secular or not. And there are more dimensions than that. There's gender, age, class, nationality etc.

I'm a huge Susan Blackmore fanboy. According to her it's the subconsciousness who is doing all the thinking. According to her our consciousness is only a brain function to facilitate communication. We continually invent a world that makes life as manageable as possible for us. At no point do we have access to the truth, other than through indirect means. We can never feel the truth, or intuitively understand it. I think the seemingly incomprehensible field of quantum mechanics makes that abundantly clear. Numbers on a page rarely touch us emotionally, no matter how important or accurate they are. At some point we cannot attach the numbers to a metaphor that is meaningful, and as far as our understanding goes, they morph into a chaotic soup.

If we accept this, then the trick is to communicate subconsciousness to subconsciousness as accurately as the translation to our consciousness will allow. Insisting on straight-talking and some kind of objective truth, isn't only unrealistic, I think it's unhelpful.

...and I understand I risk coming across as some kind of weak minded mystic or hopelessly lost New Age hippie, here. I think/hope I'm not. I agree with George Orwell, in his "Politics of the English language" one hundred percent. As authors/communicators we should strive toward precision and avoid vagueness as much as we can. My point is that precision can come in different forms, and just because somebody doesn't express themselves like you, doesn't necessarily mean their language or thinking is sloppy.

There's no shortage, on either side, of books trying to disprove one another but mixing languages in the most unfortunate manner, producing dare I say laughable results. Richard Dawkins in his "God Delusion" and CS Lewis in his "Mere Christianity" make, in my opinion, the same mistake. Everybody knows the Christian concept of God is illogical! Why bother trying to prove it is or isn't? Doing so or not, will make no difference. The idea of God will still be meaningful and touch people. Or so say I.

[AMCrenshaw]

Does it matter? What's the difference? The problem isn't whether somebody is religious or not. As far as I'm concerned the problem is some people bashing in heads demanding that other people communicate in the exact same way they are. Whether those who do this are religious or not is of little or no consequence.

I agree. Especially when that group is also making claims to knowing the truth, and that knowing the same truth demands you follow a certain authority, that's one path to the supremacy Ruv was talking about. Generally speaking, it's my opinion that strict obedience to authority opposes gaining knowledge and understanding. One thing I think religions have done in the past is centralize too much of this spreading of their knowledge and understanding under the pretense of an authority. I can't name a better example than the Catholic tradition, but it's apparent in Asian religions, too, sometimes more subtly than here in the US.

For example, in my visit to a Rinzai school in Kyoto, I watched the teacher and a student facing one another in sesshin -- it became clear to me that the poses the two people were in delineated who was the teacher and who the student. It wasn't only a distinction, but a hierarchy of value, in my opinion. It might be arguable that's only natural, that clearly a zen teacher of 30 years will know and understand more than a student, and has more to teach the student than the student does the teacher -- at least about the zen sensibility. But - like in plenty of religions - the whole note struck discordantly in my ears, like I'd read about Siddhartha, read many of the teachings, and thought that in this religion, a hierarchy of value should be obsolete. It wasn't. Rinzai is a very strict school, perhaps too strict for my tastes, nearly militant. And in the teacher, though he seemed like a kind man, revealed to me a kind of supremacy - that the knowledge and understanding would come from a change of mind, and that change of mind would come through obedience to the teacher, not to mention a thousand other kinds of discipline.

There's a thread in PCE about scientists who've been playing cheating hands, which greatly upsets me, though it doesn't surprise me. I can't think of another word to describe their actions except they're supremacist in nature -- to conclude one scientific story is better than another should follow the methodology, rather than the politics. And even in that circumstance, I see an external authority at work (be it money or ideology) that's impeding people from attaining knowledge.


AMC

[Ruv Draba]

I think this is a pretty universal human characteristic. You can find this in every single camp regardless of belief.
Every camp has its zealots and its idiots; we can find intolerance and misunderstanding everywhere, but I don't think we find supremacism everywhere. Supremacism is not just a condition of mind but of culture. It's a disease of privilege.

I mentioned that I played reluctant host to a Jehova's Witness on the weekend. Karl was his name. He'd come to correct my thinking on a day when he'd have been more useful to me reading manuscript, but nevertheless... I asked him: 'Do you feel that Christians have too little privilege in our society or too much?' He chewed on that a while and said that perhaps it's a bit of both. I asked him whether, if he were Muslim or atheist say, he would feel comfortable knocking on my door uninvited and putting his beliefs on display and he agreed that no, he probably wouldn't. He asked me what I thought motivated him to knock on strangers' doors in the first place, and in my usual blunt fashion I told him: ideology, ignorance and ego.

He said that he acted from genuine concern and I agreed that yes, I knew he did -- concern arising from an ideology he'd chosen. I also pointed out that being a Messenger with Superior Truth is something that makes us feel very special. For instance, it may let us feel so superior that we can march onto property uninvited and spread such a message though it's untimely and unwelcome. So, I agreed that his faith was an ideology of love, but that wasn't the whole story. For him at least, he feels a lot of specialness in the role.

Later in our chat he argued that for '99% of people in the world', the Bible is true and relevant. I pointed out that Christianity is actually only about a third of the world's faith, and that while non-religion is around 16% globally, it's over 30% in many countries including Australia. At this point that I think we both realised that we lived in entirely different worlds. In his world -- defined perhaps by his friends and church -- '99%' of people are Christians. In my world, they're not. (But it also highlighted the ignorance problem.)

This example itself isn't important but what it illustrates I think, is:

Karl was well-motivated, no question. He was polite, he wished me well and other than the inconvenience of his visit, I liked him.
He knew a lot about his own faith, but nothing about the faith of anyone else. He didn't know the stats or the substance of non-Christian beliefs and wasn't really interested in learning;
He agreed that he was using special privilege to talk to me, but in his mind that was entirely appropriate. I couldn't even get him to see the problem with having or using the privilege that made it normal for zealous Christians (and nobody else) to knock on strangers' doors;
He couldn't separate the quality of his own message from how good he felt being its messenger.
In context, Karl was an irritating but harmless zealot. He had no authority, no power. On my property the balance of power was of course with me; it was my courtesy rather than his power that kept him on my doorstep. But take the zealot profile above (regardless of faith) and give it authority. Make Karl a teacher, a judge, or a politician. What happens then?

Karl is already a man who knows the answers; he doesn't want to learn any more. He wasn't interested in what I thought, but what he could get me to think. He loves the privilege he has and isn't afraid to use it to promote his own culture. If he were offered more privilege, I doubt that he'd turn it down. He loves his faith but he's confused love and understanding of his faith with love and understanding of his fellow man.

What happens when we take zealots and give them power, is we get supremacists. And though that may conjure pictures of shaven-headed rednecks in trailer-parks, I think that's mythological. Supremacists look just like ordinary people and live in the same sorts of homes. It's not where they live or how they decorate their bodies but how they furnish their minds and manage their privilege which creates their creed.

If we didn't think our beliefs are superior we wouldn't hold them, now would we? We all want to think that we have an open mind, who wouldn't? But it's only open to a point.I think that my key point is this: some people stop learning; others keep learning. Some ask questions; others just repeat answers. Some amass privilege; others share privilege.

To my mind diversity in human thought is one of its great assets. I don't want a world where everyone believes the same; I think it would make us a much dumber species. I think that many lines of human thinking are broken, but so what? Working with broken things that inspire us is essential to how we've developed.

[Rhys Cordelle]

Alright, I'm not sure why you went off on that tangent. My comment was simply in response to you saying:


I think it would be a disaster. I think religious language does catch something crucial, something the language of science doesn't and can't address. I think we'd be poorer as a species without religion's language.

It doesn't sound very consistent to me to say something like this and then say that it doesn't matter whether you're religious or not. Clearly it does, if I'm missing "something crucial". I'm just asking you to clarify. Why do you think we'd be poorer without religions language?

[DrZoidberg]

I agree. Especially when that group is also making claims to knowing the truth, and that knowing the same truth demands you follow a certain authority, that's one path to the supremacy Ruv was talking about. Generally speaking, it's my opinion that strict obedience to authority opposes gaining knowledge and understanding. One thing I think religions have done in the past is centralize too much of this spreading of their knowledge and understanding under the pretense of an authority. I can't name a better example than the Catholic tradition, but it's apparent in Asian religions, too, sometimes more subtly than here in the US.

For example, in my visit to a Rinzai school in Kyoto, I watched the teacher and a student facing one another in sesshin -- it became clear to me that the poses the two people were in delineated who was the teacher and who the student. It wasn't only a distinction, but a hierarchy of value, in my opinion. It might be arguable that's only natural, that clearly a zen teacher of 30 years will know and understand more than a student, and has more to teach the student than the student does the teacher -- at least about the zen sensibility. But - like in plenty of religions - the whole note struck discordantly in my ears, like I'd read about Siddhartha, read many of the teachings, and thought that in this religion, a hierarchy of value should be obsolete. It wasn't. Rinzai is a very strict school, perhaps too strict for my tastes, nearly militant. And in the teacher, though he seemed like a kind man, revealed to me a kind of supremacy - that the knowledge and understanding would come from a change of mind, and that change of mind would come through obedience to the teacher, not to mention a thousand other kinds of discipline.

There's a thread in PCE about scientists who've been playing cheating hands, which greatly upsets me, though it doesn't surprise me. I can't think of another word to describe their actions except they're supremacist in nature -- to conclude one scientific story is better than another should follow the methodology, rather than the politics. And even in that circumstance, I see an external authority at work (be it money or ideology) that's impeding people from attaining knowledge.

AMC

I don't think the problem here is religious language or religious imagery, it's the authority, or rather how authorities are chosen. We couldn't function as humans without quite a lot of almost blind reliance on authorities (of power or knowledge). We have no way of knowing everything ourselves.

I think as far as human language is concerned, this is an unsolvable problem. ...or is it a problem? When it comes to many things, humanity is still pretty much just a bunch of monkeys howling at and mooning each other. The US creationism "debate" proves that much. We can't stop being human. We can't say, this would be better for humanity to do and get upset when it doesn't happen, if no human would ever do it. The great Soviet communism project is another good example of that.

I think Nietzsche nailed humanity's relation to power. If we love those who have power over us, we don't mind being abused, or rather, we would never see their abuse of us, as abuse, and neither would they. Likewise, if we hate those in power, we will always feel abused. "Justice", "fairness" or "freedom" here are pretty much a nonsense words. Everybody is always as free as they feel, regardless of what is going on outside their heads.

If an idea doesn't fit into our brain, we would never hold it, regardless of how true it is. I think we need to be a little bit more Zen about it or go insane

[Ruv Draba]

I don't think the problem here is religious language or religious imagery, it's the authority, or rather how authorities are chosen. We couldn't function as humans without quite a lot of almost blind reliance on authorities (of power or knowledge). We have no way of knowing everything ourselves.That's a strategy that some people take, but not all. Some care enough to go look and find out. They may accept guidance but not necessarily direction. It takes effort to think about questions and investigate answers. We can't do it for free. It's scary to ask questions that make people look at us twice. It's scary to have differing opinions to the opinions of people around us.

On the other hand, how many lives do you think you have?

[DrZoidberg]

That's a strategy that some people take, but not all. Some care enough to go look and find out. They may accept guidance but not necessarily direction. It takes effort to think about questions and investigate answers. We can't do it for free. It's scary to ask questions that make people look at us twice. It's scary to have differing opinions to the opinions of people around us.

On the other hand, how many lives do you think you have?

Hmm... I think/hope you misunderstand what I'm saying. I'm not saying that's a strategy some people take. I'm saying that it's the strategy all people take out of necessity. I'd go so far to say that the people who think they don't, are probably all very dangerous people. How brave or clever you are might help you pick a better authority figure, but there's no getting out of it. You make all your decisions based completely or partly on second-hand information from perceived authorities.

Let's for sake of argument say you believe the theory of evolution is true. How would you argue for it without invoking any second hand knowledge or authority figure? Or lets for sake of argument say you're refuting it, how would you do that without invoking any second hand knowledge or authority figure?

Is it more clear what I'm saying now?

[Rhys Cordelle]

But that's one of the benefits of the scientific method. I can put relatively blind trust in scientific theories because I know that they have been researched by experts in the field and that they have gone through rigorous testing and peer review before being published (and by published I do mean in scientific journals).

I'm not putting blind faith in any one particular scientist, I'm trusting that the scientific method works.

[DrZoidberg]

But that's one of the benefits of the scientific method. I can put relatively blind trust in scientific theories because I know that they have been researched by experts in the field and that they have gone through rigorous testing and peer review before being published (and by published I do mean in scientific journals).

I'm not putting blind faith in any one particular scientist, I'm trusting that the scientific method works.

But you do acknowledge that on some level it's blind trust.... which is the important bit. I'm not claiming that choice of truth is arbitrary, or all faiths are equally useful. Language that does not resonate emotionally within me, will be lost on me.

[Ruv Draba]

You make all your decisions based completely or partly on second-hand information from perceived authorities.I think you may be confusing sources with authorities.

Sources are challengable; authorities aren't. Whether I see a source as an authority or just a source depends on how prepared I am to see it as erroneous.


authority (http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=authority) http://www.etymonline.com/graphics/dictionary.gif (http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=authority)early 13c., autorite "book or quotation that settles an argument," from O.Fr. auctorité (12c.; Mod.Fr. autorité), from L. auctoritatem (nom. auctoritas) "invention, advice, opinion, influence, command," from auctor "master, leader, author"
In the case of evolution, say, there isn't a single authority on it, but many sources attesting to results in genetics, archaeology and biology. The process of evolution is confirmed so strongly by so many independent sources that most of us can trust in its existence more than we can trust in our own parentage (which, aside from genetic tests, has the word of only a few people).

[Rhys Cordelle]

In the case of evolution, say, there isn't a single authority on it, but many sources attesting to results in genetics, archaeology and biology. The process of evolution is confirmed so strongly by so many independent sources that most of us can trust in its existence more than we can trust in our own parentage (which, aside from genetic tests, has the word of only a few people).

This is why I'm always amused by attempts to discredit Darwin. They're ignoring the decades of research that's gone on since Darwin, and acting as if we "evolutionists" worship him in place of god.

[Ruv Draba]

This is why I'm always amused by attempts to discredit Darwin. They're ignoring the decades of research that's gone on since Darwin, and acting as if we "evolutionists" worship him in place of god.Yep. Even if Darwin's observations were utterly wrong, there's still a wealth of independent experimentation and observation to show that species adapt in response to competition and environmental pressure, and that individual adaptations are passed to offspring.

People who don't understand science very well sometimes treat scientific opinion the same as political opinion -- which in the early stages of scientific theory, it virtually is, but in the later stages of a theory's maturity it most assuredly is not. Political views have champions (sometimes also called 'authorities') and discrediting the champion can kill the view. The same is not true of scientific theories, though. There's no real authority on a theory; just more or less understanding.

I've discussed this matter at length in a recent post to P&CE on climate change. Linky here (http://absolutewrite.com/forums/showthread.php?p=4304698#post4304698).

[DrZoidberg]

I think you may be confusing sources with authorities. Sources are challengable; authorities aren't. Whether I see a source as an authority or just a source depends on how prepared I am to see it as erroneous.


I'm not convinced. Who says we can't challenge an authority? An authority is only an authority as long as we treat it as such. The pope is only an authority to Catholics. The word "sources" I think is too vague to be a viable contender in meaning. I think it's fair to say that peer review strengthens a scientists authority, not diminish it, as you're trying to argue for. Are you?

[Rhys Cordelle]

I'm not convinced. Who says we can't challenge an authority? An authority is only an authority as long as we treat it as such


We couldn't function as humans without quite a lot of almost blind reliance on authorities

If we are free to challenge it then it is not blind reliance.


I think it's fair to say that peer review strengthens a scientists authority, not diminish it, as you're trying to argue for

If a scientists theory is peer reviewed and found to be accurate by his peers, then he may be regarded as an authority on the subject, yes. But when I, as a layman, hear of that scientific theory, I accept it as fact without having first hand knowledge of the subject because I know it has gone through the scientific method and come out the other side. It doesn't matter to me who the scientist is that made the discovery (at least, not in terms of whether or not I accept the theory).

[DrZoidberg]

If we are free to challenge it then it is not blind reliance.

If a scientists theory is peer reviewed and found to be accurate by his peers, then he may be regarded as an authority on the subject, yes. But when I, as a layman, hear of that scientific theory, I accept it as fact without having first hand knowledge of the subject because I know it has gone through the scientific method and come out the other side. It doesn't matter to me who the scientist is that made the discovery (at least, not in terms of whether or not I accept the theory).

You seem to be agreeing with me about everything while saying that I'm wrong. I don't get it? Are you discussing which opinion is the most valuable to hold? Or how we weight various positions truth value against each other? I'm not.

But we've swerved from the OP. We've swerved into Epistemology. There's other and more specialised forums for such topics. Like, philosophy forums. I'm happy to discuss how to write about philosophy.

[Ruv Draba]

I'm not convinced. Who says we can't challenge an authority?Because by the very etymology of the word, an authority is a source that settles an argument. After we consult an authority there's no more argument. So we can contest which is the authority, but having accepted an authority that's that.
I think it's fair to say that peer review strengthens a scientists authority, not diminish it, as you're trying to argue for. Are you?A scientist has no authority himself, but defers to nature. People who consider the scientist the authority rather than the experiment, don't understand science. Peer review simply assures that the right sorts of experiments were undertaken, and that any conclusions are legitimate -- so it's a test of quality, not authority.

Aristotle maintained that women have fewer teeth than men; although he was twice married, it never occurred to him to verify this statement by examining his wives' mouths.
In a similar vein when we want to know how evolution actually works we don't read Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species, because that's just a theory. We have to go and look, or survey the observations of those who have. Darwin's work has historical significance, but it's not an authority.

Among scientists, some works are conventionally a preferred source -- often because of the quality of their observations, or how they're organised or the handiness of their formulae. So for instance the Periodic Table of Elements (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Periodic_table) was first organised by Mendeleev (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dmitri_Mendeleev), but was since extended when new elements were found. It's used for its convenience, but Mendeleev was never an authority on what elements exist -- and in fact the Periodic Table has been refined and reproduced so many times that while there's such a chart in almost every chemistry lab in the world, most scientists don't know who their author of their particular chart might be, and would never care. It's the experiments that show what elements exist; the chart simply organises that information.

[Lhun]

Man it's been ages. Unfortunately, i sometimes just don't have the chance to post on AW.
That's full of presumption, Lhun.

If we believe that a world is subject to immutable laws (whatever they are), then the how question comes to the fore. If instead we believe that our world is subject to will, then the why question comes to the fore. In fact, there's no scientific evidence that there are immutable laws, or that our world is not subject to the will of a very powerful being.That is not the point. The point is that the question, and the vocabulary dealing with the answer to it, after the "why", is separate from the question, and the vocabulary dealing with the answer to it, after the "how". Pick any more obvious example as a comparison if you like. Two other totally separate predicates are "colour" and "place" for example. If you ask after the colour of an object you can get a certain kind of answer. But this kind is not a possible answer when asked about the location of an object. Because the question deal with separate categories. And inferring the answer to one of the questions from the answer to the other question will always be invalid. The inference might be correct or incorrect, based mostly on coincidence, but it is always invalid.
A counterexample would be for example "height" and "size". those are related, and thus making inferences from one about the other can be valid.
The ontological and teleological categories are the same as the colour and location example above, whether there is an omnipotent being or not. You cannot infer the intention of a designer from his design. If you disagree i can show you some pictures of modern "art design" furniture that prove the point even for human designers. ;) You likewise cannot infer design from intention.
Even when a certain intention requires a very specific design, there will always be possibilities like, for example, and incompetent designer whose designs just don't achieve his intentions. Many an ashtray "designed" by a first grader demonstrates this.
The fallacy is very tempting, by going with the "form follows function" philosophy. But that is very relevant additional knowledge that has to be provided first. I.e. if you know the designer, know his intentions, and know how he designs something, then you can infer from his intentions what his designs will be. But given just intention, and not information about the designer (as is certainly the case in nature, where we don't even know if there *is* a designer) than any and all inferences are invalid. And it's the same when starting with the design instead of the intentions.
What makes the scientific method reliable?
On reflection, isn't it the consistency of the Way Things Work?
But what makes those things consistent?
Answer: we don't know.
There is a difference between what makes the scientific method reliable, and why we consider it reliable.
What makes the scientific method reliable is the inbuilt method of self-correction. Basically the whole of the scientific method *is* self-correction. And it will always be reliable, given a world that follows some, any really, laws. The only world where it wouldn't work is one that is inherently unpredictable. Note also that the real measure for science only is "reliable". Not "Truth" or anything else absolute. At most "truth" when defined as a pragmatic truth-concept.
The reason we consider the scientific method reliable (which is really the reason we think the world is consistent, not random) is simple everyday experience. The pragmatic standard for truth if you want to put it in terms of truth philosophy. Every second of our lives we consider the world predictable. When we wake up and the sun rises in the east, when we let go of a stone and it drops, or when we drink a glass of water and don't instantly dissolve.
Thinking that the world is reliable, that things that happened yesterday in a certain way will happen the same today and tomorrow is deeply ingrained in our being human. Trying to make exceptions in certain areas of life, most usually those of little consequence to everyday life, is just an exercise in cognitive dissonance. And it is a little silly really, to question the constancy of the world, when every morning you are not surprised seeing the sun rise, because in this case you expect constancy.
That would depend on whether things remain consistent and any reasons for existence (if there are any) remain obscure to us.

But if we can't guarantee the above, then we can't say that rational materialism is the only viable way to work. We can say that it has been the most reliable way to work so far, but we can't say that (for example) revelation won't someday prove to be more viable. It just hasn't yet.No. The scientific method is the only possible way of reliably acquiring knowledge, because it is the only one with an inbuilt mechanism for self-correction. Nothing else, at least so far, is self-correcting and thus at best questionable and at worst useless. In the case of revelation, how would you ever even know whether it was a case of true revelation, or just a case of an oracle lying in your face? Maybe there really are gods granting truth to oracles. But because you have no way of independently confirming this truth, you never know whether you're being told the result of a revelation, or just a lie. If however, you can just pray to the gods yourself to acquire independent confirmation, you're once again employing the scientific method. You haven't replaced science with revelation, you just replaced measuring instruments with gods.

[Ruv Draba]

What makes the scientific method reliable is the inbuilt method of self-correction....coupled with the inexplicable historical fact that repeated experiments produce identical results in virtually every domain we play with. But science isn't the only self-correcting thinking, as I'll discuss below. It's merely our most reliable.

And it will always be reliable, given a world that follows some, any really, laws.Actually, there's nothing requiring that empirical consistency entails logical consistency. For example, there is a class of logics called paraconsistent (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-paraconsistent/)logics in which contradictions occur in certain parts of the domain, but not in all parts. So weirdness happens locally, but doesn't explode into chaos if you don't fall down the rabbit-hole.

Our experiences being necessarily finite, there's nothing to assure us that the universe is consistent across space and time and not paraconsistent across the whole domain, but locally consistent in our experience of it. We even have to ask ourselves whether causality is not manufactured in part from our perceptions and memories (and that question is still in doubt).

Every second of our lives we consider the world predictable.Consistency is not predictability. For one thing, consistency is retrospective and descriptive, whereas prediction is prospective and prescriptive. To explain one car accident is not to forecast the next one. Indeed, there are some theoretical studies [1 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory), 2 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NP-completeness)] that raise into question whether we can ever predict some systems within tolerance.

Moreover, even if the universe is utterly consistent, there are some logical results (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del's_incompleteness_theorems) to show that human language is too limited to even express some truths, much less prove them. And it turns out (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Higher_order_logics) that the language we'd need to express some propositions is also logically inconsistent and badly-behaved. So we may well have a choice of being mad or systemically ignorant in our rationality, and it may be that the Universe is either utterly reliable or playing a very funny game with us -- and we may well be stuck never quite knowing which. :)

I personally don't believe that we have a well-formed language with which to discuss metaphysics, much less a decent calculus with which to work it. For that reason, I dismiss all metaphysical propositions, whether secular or sectarian, as being fictive gibberish. I don't believe that they have truth-values, much less having any clue as to how to evaluate them. In my view we can have fun pretending to do metaphysics, but I see it as entertainment more than science. We can't talk seriously about metaphysics until we can engineer the objective behaviour of the reality we live in -- and we haven't demonstrated that yet.


The scientific method is the only possible way of reliably acquiring knowledge, because it is the only one with an inbuilt mechanism for self-correction.This is probably a circular definition, Lhun, because it hinges on what you consider knowledge to be. Here are two possible definitions, one supporting your thesis and one refuting it:
Knowledge is any information empirically tested and shown reliable;
Knowledge is any information on which we're willing to act and learn from, regardless of how much is empirically verified.
Definition 1) means that physics is a body of knowledge while theology is not. Definition 2) allows that both physics and theologies are bodies of knowledge. You might argue that a scientist can only support definition 1), but I think you'll find that 'soft scientists' like psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists and economists have fondness for 2) because behaviourally it acts like 1) -- even if it's not based entirely on empirical study, and it predicts human behaviour better.

Epistemologically I don't at all like the ambiguity between definitions 1) and 2). To avoid rhetorical tricks and semantic confusion I want to use different words for these things. I often use 'knowledge' for 1) and 'lore' for 2. But I can't preclude some future revelation from collapsing 'knowledge' into 'lore'. It just hasn't happened yet.

Also behaviourally, I have to acknowledge that a lot of investigations into 1) have been guided by 2). Newton and Einstein for instance, were both Deists who happily let their metaphysical lore direct their empirical enquiries, and without question we are richer for their work. So not only can I not provide assurance that science is not simply lore, I can't even assure myself that science doesn't need revelatory lore to progress.

Finally, I have to acknowledge that most people I know don't and can't operate from 1. For various psychological reasons they much prefer to operate from 2, or sometimes (e.g. in childhood), they have no choice.

So I'm faced with the situation of either defining two classes of thinkers and getting all supremacist about rationalism, or taking the more humanitarian tack and acknowledging that people who are functioning without being strictly rational are the norm -- and that any compassionate discussion of knowledge must take that into account. Because for me, the search for truth connects to compassion and because I'm sometimes horrified at the inhumane lunacy of ultrarationalists, I've tried to take the latter course.

However, what I can assure myself is that lore without empiricism is hellishly unreliable. I'm a rationalist but not a rational-supremacist. I don't rely on lore to give me truth any more than I'd trust a kleptomaniac as a banker, but that still doesn't mean that all kleptomaniacs make poor investment decisions.

[Lhun]

...coupled with the inexplicable historical fact that repeated experiments produce identical results in virtually every domain we play with.Well, in a world without consistency, science and knowledge (at least knowledge of the world) are not possible.
Actually, there's nothing requiring that empirical consistency entails logical consistency.No, what i was getting at was that logical consistency results in empirical consistency. Maybe i should have elaborated that by natural laws i meant the usual definition of a real "law", not the more specific scientific definition of: repeatable empirical observation which can be described with a mathematical formula.
For example, there is a class of logics called paraconsistent (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-paraconsistent/)logics in which contradictions occur in certain parts of the domain, but not in all parts. So weirdness happens locally, but doesn't explode into chaos if you don't fall down the rabbit-hole.

Our experiences being necessarily finite, there's nothing to assure us that the universe is consistent across space and time and not paraconsistent across the whole domain, but locally consistent in our experience of it. We even have to ask ourselves whether causality is not manufactured in part from our perceptions and memories (and that question is still in doubt).Well, let me point out again that a pragmatic truth standard is what we apply during the majority of our lives, and it is what science operates with. While interesting philosophically, it is disingenuous or careless to operate with an absolute truth standard while criticising science. Paraconsistent logic, while interesting mathematically, is neither very relevant nor very surprising for natural science.
Consistency is not predictability. For one thing, consistency is retrospective and descriptive, whereas prediction is prospective and prescriptive. To explain one car accident is not to forecast the next one. Indeed, there are some theoretical studies [1 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory), 2 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NP-completeness)] that raise into question whether we can ever predict some systems within tolerance.I think you're going for a different definition of consistency here. Usually, consistency begets predictability since consistency works (has to) both retrospective and prospective. This is logical predictability, mind you. It does not mean at all that we would actually be able to utilize it. Chaotic systems are a prime example of that. They follow consistent rules, and are thus completely predictable. We can not however do that, since predicting future states of a chaotic system requires an accuracy of knowledge of the current state that quickly approaches infinity as one tries to predict points in time farther into the future.
Moreover, even if the universe is utterly consistent, there are some logical results (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del's_incompleteness_theorems) to show that human language is too limited to even express some truths, much less prove them. And it turns out (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Higher_order_logics) that the language we'd need to express some propositions is also logically inconsistent and badly-behaved. So we may well have a choice of being mad or systemically ignorant in our rationality, and it may be that the Universe is either utterly reliable or playing a very funny game with us -- and we may well be stuck never quite knowing which. :)You are again talking about a category of truth that has its place in philosophical discussions, but not discussions about natural science.
I personally don't believe that we have a well-formed language with which to discuss metaphysics, much less a decent calculus with which to work it. For that reason, I dismiss all metaphysical propositions, whether secular or sectarian, as being fictive gibberish. I don't believe that they have truth-values, much less having any clue as to how to evaluate them. In my view we can have fun pretending to do metaphysics, but I see it as entertainment more than science. We can't talk seriously about metaphysics until we can engineer the objective behaviour of the reality we live in -- and we haven't demonstrated that yet.Well, that might depend a little on how you define "metaphysics", but beyond that, then there's hardly a point arguing about you not believing that arguing is possible, is there?This is probably a circular definition, Lhun, because it hinges on what you consider knowledge to be.No, it is a pragmatic definition.
Here are two possible definitions, one supporting your thesis and one refuting it:
Knowledge is any information empirically tested and shown reliable;
Knowledge is any information on which we're willing to act and learn from, regardless of how much is empirically verified.
Definition 1) means that physics is a body of knowledge while theology is not. Definition 2) allows that both physics and theologies are bodies of knowledge. You might argue that a scientist can only support definition 1), but I think you'll find that 'soft scientists' like psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists and economists have fondness for 2) because behaviourally it acts like 1) -- even if it's not based entirely on empirical study, and it predicts human behaviour better.In both cases most of your definition of knowledge depends on your definition of information. But besides that, definition 2) is useless. It does nothing to distinguish information and knowledge, because the only difference it posits is the state of the one possessing that information, which is not a predicate of the information itself. As such you have just defined knowledge out of existence.
For a useful definition, there must be something inherent to certain packets of information which qualifies them for the "knowledge" moniker, as opposed to other information packets.
If we examine it pragmatically again, we will find that we only consider information knowledge which we are willing to consider true, and observer-independent true. The most important feature of truth (as knowledge is merely information about a truth we might just talk about truth directly) is that it is true, or not, regardless of the person considering it. We do not call something truth if it is only true for some people. And the scientific method is designed to eliminate personal bias. It is not so much that we only consider scientific knowledge to be true in the modern age, but that science was designed to produce information which we consider true. But what we consider truths hasn't changed much over the ages, and there aren't really people who have a different definition for it. Just a lot of people who engage in special pleading for one belief or another.
Epistemologically I don't at all like the ambiguity between definitions 1) and 2). To avoid rhetorical tricks and semantic confusion I want to use different words for these things. I often use 'knowledge' for 1) and 'lore' for 2. But I can't preclude some future revelation from collapsing 'knowledge' into 'lore'. It just hasn't happened yet.I think i understand what you want to get at, basically a consensus standard for truth as an alternative to a pragmatic standard for truth. Though i'm sorry to say that you definition 2) fell a bit short there. ;) You need to include at least the requirement of a majority of people, or a significant number of people, who are willing to act on information. Otherwise anything would be knowledge (or lore) as long as you find at least one nut willing to act on it.
The important point however is that usually, people do not make the distinction between knowledge and lore that you make. I won't argue with you if you want to state that there are other ways to arrive at lore than to derive it from knowledge. I will however argue with anyone equivocating lore and knowledge, and stating that there are different ways to arrive at knowledge. Which is, sadly, more often the case than the former. Especially among postmodernists or the newage crowd, who are just engaging in special pleading. Though it inspires some extremely funny beat poems. (a cookie for whoever gets the reference)
Also behaviourally, I have to acknowledge that a lot of investigations into 1) have been guided by 2). Newton and Einstein for instance, were both Deists who happily let their metaphysical lore direct their empirical enquiries, and without question we are richer for their work. So not only can I not provide assurance that science is not simply lore, I can't even assure myself that science doesn't need revelatory lore to progress.I'm afraid your argument doesn't hold here. What defines knowledge is how one arrives at it. Having non-knowledge as inspiration, or seeking to confirm non-knowledge scientifically as in trying to prove lore knowledge, does not change the result. If it full-fills the criteria, it is knowledge, that's all. Whether science could be done in a vacuum or needs non-science as inspiration is an interesting question but a different discussion. Though let me just say that inspirations in science are a bit like ideas in writing. They're a dime a dozen, and what made Newton and Einstein great wasn't their deism (though i'd dispute that Einstein was a deist) but that they followed their ideas through.
Finally, I have to acknowledge that most people I know don't and can't operate from 1. For various psychological reasons they much prefer to operate from 2, or sometimes (e.g. in childhood), they have no choice.I disagree. Most people operate from 1) most of the time. Few people all of the time. It's just that most people have some beliefs they engage in special pleading for. (I'm not talking religious here, the stupid monty hall debate is a prime example) Another thing are memes like urban legends, that just seem to plug into some irrational part in our brains. Though a big part of that is probably because there's no relevance to urban legends and the like.
So I'm faced with the situation of either defining two classes of thinkers and getting all supremacist about rationalism, or taking the more humanitarian tack and acknowledging that people who are functioning without being strictly rational are the norm -- and that any compassionate discussion of knowledge must take that into account. Because for me, the search for truth connects to compassion and because I'm sometimes horrified at the inhumane lunacy of ultrarationalists, I've tried to take the latter course.Well, i don't think there are two classes of thinkers, just people who more or less often think critically, see above.
But i hardly think there's a connection to humanism here. I'd say you are extending the debate from epistemology to areas such as ethics, where ultrarationalism can lead to bad conclusions. But in a discussion just about truth, that's not relevant.
However, what I can assure myself is that lore without empiricism is hellishly unreliable. I'm a rationalist but not a rational-supremacist. I don't rely on lore to give me truth any more than I'd trust a kleptomaniac as a banker, but that still doesn't mean that all kleptomaniacs make poor investment decisions.No, rejecting lore as wrong because of what it is, is jumping the gun. That does happen quite often to scientifically minded people, and if that was the only thing the post-modernists and newage crowd criticised they'd have a point. There's of course quite a difference between recognizing that lore is inherently unreliable and stating that it's inherently wrong. One shouldn't take the insistence that lore isn't knowledge as the letter either though.